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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, we address a new security problem in the realm of collaborating
sensor networks. By collaborating sensor networks, we refer to the networks of sensor
networks collaborating on a mission, with each sensor network is independently owned
and operated by separate entities. Such networks are practical where a number of
independent entities can deploy their own sensor networks in multi-national, commercial,
and environmental scenarios, and some of these networks will integrate complementary
functionalities for a mission. In the scenario, we address an authentication problem
wherein the goal is for the Operator Oi of Sensor Network Si to correctly determine the
number of active sensors in Network Si. Such a problem is challenging in collaborating
sensor networks where other sensor networks, despite showing an intent to collaborate,
may not be completely trustworthy and could compromise the authentication process. We
propose two authentication protocols to address this problem. Our protocols rely on
Physically Unclonable Functions, which are a hardware based authentication primitive
exploiting inherent randomness in circuit fabrication. Our protocols are light-weight,
energy efficient, and highly secure against a number of attacks. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first to addresses a practical security problem in collaborating
sensor networks.
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NOMENCLATURE

Symbol

Description

Oi

Operator of Sensor Network Si

ski

Sensor sk belonging to the ith Sensor Network

r

Query round

Nr,ki

Nonce shared between sensor ski and Oi for Round r

Yki, Zki

Two secret keys shared between Sensor ski and Oi

PUFki

Physically Unclonable Function of Sensor ski

C(r,k)i

Challenge Vector for Sensor ski in Round r

A(r,k)i

Authentication Challenge for Sensor ski in Round r

PUFki(C(r,k)i) PUF response of Sensor ski to Challenge C(r,k)i in Round r

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEM
Wireless Sensor Networks are proving to be indispensable technologies in many
military and civilian settings. Practical necessities today both in military and civilian
scenarios indicate that sensor networks in the near future will not be operating entirely
independently, but will rather collaborate with peer networks owned and operated by
other entities to collaborate on mission tasks. However, when missions involve multiple
countries and/or commercial perspectives, complete trust between collaborating networks
is not practical. Consider the following two scenarios:
1.1.1. Multi-Country Scenario. There is an abundant amount of natural
phenomena that can occur in which several countries are affected. Earthquakes can affect
numerous regions across multiple countries, volcanic debris can cover hundreds of square
miles, and tsunamis can reach entire coastlines. Detection of these events in order to
provide advance warning and aid is significantly important to all the countries vulnerable
to such a disaster, and by collaborating with nearby countries, larger sensor nets can be
deployed to detect such phenomena as they form and occur at further distances. However,
complete trust is improbable as each country will still also possess goals and agendas that
may not necessarily be advantageous to the other collaborating countries (pollution and
climate policies, etc.).
1.1.2. A Commercial/Environmental Scenario. With commercial and
environmental applications of sensor networks like soil monitoring, weather prediction,
healthcare, etc., becoming feasible, there is an interest today in sensor-clouds [1, 2, 3, 4]
where multiple independent sensor networks are integrated into a cloud framework
providing services not possible with a single sensor network. It is likely that individual
networks, from competing businesses and organizations may compromise overall
functionality of the integrated network and services for selfish gains.
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1.2. PROBLEM ADDRESSED
In this thesis, we address the following problem - Given n collaborating S1, S2, S3,
…, Sn, how can the Operator Oi of Network Si correctly authenticate active sensors in its
network.
This problem is clearly unique to scenarios where multiple sensor networks
collaborate, and is practical, since knowing which are active (i.e., functioning) sensors in
its own network is critical for network operators. Note here that the solution to this
problem is not trivial in the presence of other untrusted sensor networks. When Operator
Oi of Network Si issues a query requesting sensors that are active in its network to report,
sensors in another network Sj can masquerade as sensors in Network Si, packets can be
dropped, corrupted, or replayed during forwarding, and malicious entities may also fake
Oi.

1.3. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We propose two handshaking protocols to solve the above problem in this thesis.
Our protocols rely on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs are circuits in
hardware that provide hardware based authentication of a device. Briefly, given a
challenge, a PUF circuit generates a verifiable response. The salient feature of the PUF
design is that since their behavior is based on inherent randomness of physical hardware
during fabrication, their behavior is not predictable before hand, nor is the behavior
clonable. Depending on the hardware characteristics and physical property exploited like
circuit delays, voltage values at power-up, ring oscillator frequencies, PUFs have been
designed with a large number of challenge response pairs up to 264 with minimal
increases in circuit overhead and latency [5]. Our protocols use a combination of PUF
responses, XOR encryption and aggregation to address the authentication problem, while
being resilient to a variety of attacks.
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2. PRELIMINARIES

2.1. PRELIMINARIES OUTLINE
In this section, we present important preliminaries related to our authentication
problem and proposed protocols. In Section 2.1, we present the overall system model.
The problem formulation is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses a number of
attacks compromising the authentication problem. A brief overview of Physically
Unclonable Functions, which form the core technology used in our authentication
protocols, is presented next in Section 2.4.

2.2. SYSTEM MODEL
In this thesis, we are concerned with a network of independently operated but
collaborating sensor networks. Figure 1 illustrates a simple case, where there are three
sensor networks collaborating in a deployment field. Let us denote these sensor networks
as S1, S2, S3. For illustration, let us assume that S1 is a network of temperature sensors, S2
is a network of infra-red sensors, and S3 is a network of seismic sensors. These three
sensor networks are independently owned and operated by O1, O2, and O3 respectively,
and are expected to collaborate on the field, and communicate with each other. A
practical application in this scenario is intruder sensing via fusing information from
multiple sensors in multiple networks, despite each sensor network independently
executing its own mission.
All sensors are assumed to be static. A sensor in one network may use sensors in
another network during routing. A sensor in one network may or not be interested in the
information communicated by a sensor in another network. There is some key
management scheme that is used by the sensors to protect their communications from
eavesdropping by external adversaries. Since sensors can be faulty/ fail/ or be energy
depleted, the number of active sensors in any network can change over time. Because of
the collaborative nature of the sensor networks, each one is assumed to be able to read to
some extent the messages sent by another sensor network.
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2.3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem we address in the above system model is the following. How can
Operator Oi correctly determine which are the active sensors in its own Network Si
whenever it wishes to. We can see from Figure 1, the number of sensors in Networks S1,
S2, and S3 are 10, 12, and 8 respectively. However, as time goes on, sensors in a particular
network may become faulty, may fail, or may be become energy depleted. If a significant
number of sensors in a particular Network Si does become in-active, Operator Oi may
desire to know this so that corrective action can be subsequently taken to mitigate
network deficiency. Note that in practice, such a query from Oi will not arrive very often.
It is expected to be generated over longer time intervals, or when Oi suspects any major
change in the network state.

2.4. ATTACKS COMPROMISING AUTHENTICATION
Because of the collaboration with other sensor networks, there are two different
sets of potential adversaries. The first type of adversary is the one who is external to all of
the sensor networks. The second type of adversary is one that is part of the collaborative
sensor network. This is an adversary who is also a friend, one whom a primary goal of
accomplishing a given mission is shared, but there may also be a secondary goal of
denying some amount of information to their collaborating partner or to learn secrets that
were not meant to be shared.
The external adversary can easily launch eavesdropping attacks at the sensor
network in an attempt to learn secrets and vulnerabilities of the sensors and the network.
They can also use masquerade and reflection attacks to trick sensors and / or the operator
into revealing secrets and responses used in the authentication process. This attacker can
also launch DOS, jamming, and routing attacks in an attempt to disrupt and deny
communications in the sensor network. Finally, this attacker can attempt to physically
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Figure 2.1 Three Collaborating Sensor Networks

tamper with the sensor in an attempt to gain control or learn information from the sensor.
The allied adversary can launch all of the same attacks as the external adversary;
however, the effectiveness of these attacks is much different due to level of access
provided to this adversary. First, the allied adversary already have access to some
information in the network such as types of sensors available, sensor IDs, sensor
locations, etc. Second, because information is shared between sensors in the network, the
allied adversary has an established manner of communication with the sensors of the
operator's network that includes encryption keys necessary for preventing an external
adversary from reading the sensor networks' communications. These two factors allow
for the allied adversary to have a more effective attack for some attacks such as
eavesdropping, masquerade, and reflection attacks.
Since the goal is to securely authenticate sensors in the presence of an allied
adversary and due to the elevated nature of the attacks that can be launched by an allied
adversary, only the allied adversary will be considered during security analysis.

2.5. PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
Our proposed solution to the authentication problem proposes leveraging
Physically Unclonable Functions. We assume each sensor in a network is provisioned
with its own Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). A PUF is an innovative circuit
primitive that provides a mechanism to extract secrets leveraging from physical
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randomness in hardware fabrication of integrated circuits (ICs) [11, 12, 13, 5, 14, 15].
More specifically, a PUF is a hardware primitive who behavior is determined by the
physical structure of the hardware itself and its construction. The randomness of
fabrication during circuit constructions makes no two circuits exactly the same. While a
particular circuit exhibits repeatable behavior, predicting its performance before hand is
not possible, and cloning of the circuit is highly impractical. Typically, PUFs are used in
a challenge-response mechanism, wherein given a Challenge C, the PUF for a particular
device will respond with a Response R. While R is repeatable for the same C, guessing or
cloning the circuit to derive R is not possible hence providing a straightforward
mechanism for hardware based authentication.
A number of properties of ICs today lend themselves to creating PUFs. An
Optical PUF can be generated as a result of speckle patterns (intensity patterns produced
by the mutual interference of a set of wave fronts) emanated when a laser beam shines on
an optical material [16]. These patterns are random, unique, and unclonable, hence
realizing an optical physically unclonable, hence realizing an optical PUF. Another type
of PUF is called a Coating based PUF, where above a normal IC, a network of metal
wires is laid out in a comb shape. The space between and above the comb structure is
filled with an opaque material and randomly doped with dielectric particles. Because of
the random placement, size, and dielectric strength of the particles, the capacitance
between each couple of metal wires will be random up to a certain extent. A number of
PUFs exploiting other physical properties that exhibit randomness during circuit
fabrications have been designed exploiting inherent randomness during circuit
fabrications. These include delay based PUF exploits random variations in delays of
wires and gates on silicon [11, 12], oscillator frequencies [11, 13, 5], voltage values
during power-up of SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) [14, 15].
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Table 2.1 Properties of Physically Unclonable Functions
PUF Type

No. of

No. of

Response

Energy Per

Gates

Bits

Time

Response

105

1ms

450

264

5ns

0.239pJ

1159

496

1650ns

244.2pJ

256

250

11ns

Optical PUF [11, 12]
Delay based Arbiter
[11, 12]
Ring Frequency
Oscillator [11, 13, 5]
SRAM Voltage based
PUF [14, 15]

With advances in hardware miniaturization, PUFs are becoming increasingly
practical, with minimal overhead in space and energy expenditure. For instance, it is
estimated that implementing a delay circuit requires about 6 to 8 gates for each input bit,
and oscillating counter circuit that measures delay requires about 33 gates. Therefore, a
64-bit input delay PUF requires only about 545 gates [5]. A typical coating PUF has been
implemented in [17] with just 1000 gates, and the optical PUF implemented in [16] can
yield upto 10^6 challenge-response pairs with a delay of around 1 ms per authentication.
The use of 256 SRAM blocks has been shown to yield 100 bits of true randomness each
time the memory is powered up [15]. Note that the reliance on PUFS on subtle inherent
physical variations during fabrication means that they are inherently sensitive to physical
tampering [18, 19, 13, 20], and can be easily detected with incorrectly received responses
after a circuit is tampered. Table 2 summarizes some PUF implementations and their
properties.
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3. OUR BASIC 3-WAY HANDSHAKING PROTOCOL

3.1. PROTCOL INTRODUCTION
We now present our basic 3-way handshaking protocol for authentication in
collaborating sensor networks. We first present the description of the protocol, followed
by an analysis on the security performance against attacks. We also assume that the total
number of active sensors in Network S is m.

3.2. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Protocol 1 presents our basic 3-way handshaking protocol. The protocol is
executed each time (or round) when the Operator Oi intends to authenticate sensors
belonging to network Si. Consider an arbitrary Round r. Operator Oi will broadcast a
query consisting of a Challenge Vector for that round:

 N( r ,1)i || Y1i ⊕ C( r ,1)i || Z1i ⊕ A( r ,1)i 


 N( r , 2)i || Y2i ⊕ C( r , 2)i || Z 2i ⊕ A( r , 2 )i 


...


i
i
i
i
i
 N( r , m) || Ym ⊕ C( r , m) || Z m ⊕ A( r , m ) 

where N(r,k)i is a nonce shared between Operator Oi and Sensor ski. Once a sensor ski
verifies that the nonce received is expected, it proceeds with the following steps.
Otherwise, the message is discarded. Note that the nonce for the first round is pre-stored
on sensor ski. This completes the first part of the handshaking protocol. Using its secret
keys pre-distributed keys Yki and Zki, sensor ski extracts two challenges C(r,k)i and A(r,k)i.
Here C(r,k)i denotes the challenge issued by the operator whose response from ski will then
be used to authenticate it, while A(r,k)i denotes the subsequent challenge whose response
from Oi will enable sensor ski verify that its response was indeed received by Oi correctly.
Once a sensor ski extracts C(r,k)i, it will compute a Response P(r,k)i which is the output of
the sensor’s physically unclonable function, i.e., P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i). This response
along with the sensor ID is then routed back to Operator Oi as [ski || P(r,k)i ⊕ Yki]. This
completes the second part of the handshaking protocol.
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Once Operator Oi receives responses (after a tolerable delay), it will verify if the
received P(r,k)i is the expected one for Sensor ski. For every sensor whose response was
correctly authenticated, the operator will derive Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i). For any sensor sji
whose response cannot be verified as correct, Q(r,j)i is set to a random bit string. This
prevents any attackers targeting the unverified node to learn any information about the
protocol by the absence of a message or data value. Operator Oi will broadcast this
response to all sensors in the network in order to convince sensors receipt of their
responses, along with the nonce for the next round. The message transmitted is

Q( r ,1) i ⊕ Y1i || Q( r ,1) i ⊕ N ( r +1,1) ⊕ Z 1i 


Q( r , 2 ) i ⊕ Y2 i || Q( r , 2) i ⊕ N ( r +1, 2 ) i ⊕ Z 2 i 


...


i
i
i
i
i
Q( r ,m ) ⊕ Ym || Q( r , m ) ⊕ N ( r +1,m ) ⊕ Z m 

Each sensor ski can now verify if its message was indeed received correctly by
verifying the correctness of Q(r,k)i, based on the challenge A(r,k)i that it already possesses.
Each sensor will also be able to successfully extract the expected Nonce N(r+1,k)i for the
next round r + 1. If Q(r,k)i for sensor ski is not the expected value, this means that Oi did
not receive the sensor’s response due to possible packet drop or corruption enroute.
Hence Sensor ski will send its original P(r,k)i via multiple routing paths to the operator
expecting an acknowledgement. If an acknowledgement from Oi still does not arrive, the
sensor can practically consider itself in-active due to a broken communication link with
the operator. This completes the 3-way handshaking protocol.

3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we present a security analysis of Protocol 1 against attacks
discussed in Section 2.3.
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3.3.1. Eavesdropping Attacks. The attacker can eavesdrop on any
communication in the network. However, the adversary will not be able to infer any
information that could compromise the authentication process. By observing the PUF
responses P(r,k)i of sensor ski in Round r, the adversary will not be able to infer anything
useful about the current or subsequent communication since PUF responses cannot be
predicted in advance or cloned. Note that it may be possible that the adversary may infer
the number of sensors belonging to a network by observing the number of responses.
Such an attack can be easily thwarted if Operator O introduces dummy entries in its
queries, and if sensors send dummy message during query responses. Dummy queries
will not be processed, while dummy responses from sensors will be identified by the
operator and discarded. The downside though may be increased overhead during the
messages forwarding.
Also, an eavesdropping adversary may capture messages from the operator.
However, since messages are encrypted using secret keys Yki and Zki for sensor ski, the
adversary will not be able to infer Challenges C(r,k)i or A(r,k)i for Round r (Step 1).
Similarly, the adversary can eavesdrop on the response message of the operator for
Round r (Step 19). The adversary could then attempt to discover information by
observing the plain text nonce in the next round. First, the adversary will not be able to
infer N(r+1,k)i for Sensor ski from any passive observations in Round r due to encryption.
Also, by performing operations Q(r,k)i ⊕ Yki ⊕ Q(r,k)i ⊕ N(r+1,k)i ⊕ Zki ⊕ N(r+1,k)i, the
adversary will only be able to infer Yki ⊕ Zki, which itself yields no useful information
about the keys stored.
3.3.2. Masquerading Attacks. Attackers may impersonate sensors in the network
during querying. However, a masquerading sensor will not be to generate the correct PUF
response. Such messages will be identified as fake by the operator and discarded
automatically. Note that since PUFs cannot be cloned due to their inherent randomness
during fabrication, circuit cloning attacks are infeasible.
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Protocol 1 Basic 3-way Handshaking Protocol in Round r

1: Operator Oi sends

 N( r ,1)i || Y1i ⊕ C( r ,1)i || Z1i ⊕ A( r ,1)i 


 N( r , 2)i || Y2i ⊕ C( r , 2)i || Z 2i ⊕ A( r , 2 )i  to


...


i
i
i
i
i
 N( r , m) || Ym ⊕ C( r , m) || Z m ⊕ A( r , m ) 

sensors

2: End 1-way handshake
3: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps
4: IF N(r,k)i is as expected
5:
Extract C(r,k)i and A(r,k)i
6:
Compute P(r,k)i= PUFki(C(r,k)i)
7:
ski sends [ski || P(r,k)i] to Oi
8: ELSE Reject Request
9: END IF
10: End 2-way handshake
11: Operator Oi executes the following steps for each Sensor ski
12: IF received P(r,k)i matches expected response
13:
Authenticated Sensor ski as Active
14:
Compute Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i)
15: ELSE
16:
Consider Sensor ski as Inactive
17:
Set Q(r,k)i = Random bit string
18: END IF
19: Operator

Q( r ,1)i ⊕ Y1i || Q( r ,1)i ⊕ N ( r +1,1) i ⊕ Z1i 


Oi Q( r , 2 )i ⊕ Y2i || Q( r , 2)i ⊕ N( r +1, 2)i ⊕ Z 2i 


...


i
i
i
i
i
Q( r , m ) ⊕ Y1 || Q( r , m ) ⊕ N ( r +1, m ) ⊕ Z m 

20: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps
21: IF Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i)
22:
Extract Nonce N(r+1,1)i for Round r + 1
23: ELSE Send P(r,k)i to Oi via multiple routing paths
24: END IF
25: End 3-way handshake
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3.3.3. Reflection Attacks. Reflection attacks are not a threat to the authentication
process in Protocol 1, since the challenges and response of sensors and the operator are
different. Sensors will respond with the PUF value only upon correctly verifying the
nonce from the operator which are not exposed to the adversary. Similarly the adversary
will never gain knowledge of, or generate the PUF value that can be used for a
subsequent authentication process. Even if the adversary captures the PUF response for a
challenge, the same challenge is very unlikely to be used again for sufficiently long
challenge bit sequences. As pointed earlier in Table 2, up to 264 challenge-responses are
feasible with PUFs today. Hence reflection attacks are addressed in Protocol 1.
3.3.4. Packet Drop/ Packet Corruption Attacks. In a network of collaborating
sensor networks, any of the messages sent by the operator or the sensor may travel
through sensors belonging to other networks. In this scenario the message may be
dropped, potentially disrupting the authentication process. This can be easily detected
because, at each phase of the protocol, a message is expected by either the operator or the
sensor. If that message does not arrive, the sensor and/or operator can resend its previous
message with or without modifications to the routing path until a set number of retry
attempts is met, at which point the sensor can be considered inactive due to the inability
to successfully communicate with the sensor. The same responses and consequences will
also be used if a packet corruption attack is used instead. In either case, this does not
compromise the correctness of Protocol 1. These attacks are similar to a denial of service
attack except that instead targeting the sensor, the routing path is targeted.
3.3.5. Replay and Selective Forwarding Attacks. Replay and Selective
Forwarding attacks can be launched by other malicious sensors that have eavesdropped
on previous packets. However, since the PUF responses are unique to every challenge,
there is no incentive for adversaries to launch such attacks. An adversary that attempts to
launch replay or selective forwarding attacks will be ignored by the sensors, since the
expected nonce will never match. The energy consumed for comparing a sequence of bits
is very minimal in sensors. Furthermore, if repeated replay and selective fowarding
attacks are launched, it is easy for sensors to detect the presence of an adversary and
notify the operator who can then take other corrective actions.
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3.3.6. Denial of Service Attacks. In the event that attackers are able to jam one or
more sensors in the network, their responses will not be able to reach the operator. As
long as a jamming attack continues, the sensor being jammed is practically useless, and
hence it will not be considered as an active sensor by the operator.
3.3.7. Physical Attacks. As pointed earlier in the section, PUFs provide an
inherent resilience against physical tampering [18, 19, 13, 20]. When adversaries
physically tamper with sensors, the physical characteristics of the circuit will be altered,
and the PUF responses to challenges will also be altered. Upon receiving incorrect PUF
responses to challenges, the operator will subsequently identify a physically tampered
sensor as inactive.
As shown, our protocol is highly resilient against a variety of attacks. While some
of the attacks can disrupt and block communications with a given sensor, the allied
adversary is still unable to break the authentication protocol outlined above. This also
holds true for an external adversary since their attacks will not have the level of access
available to the allied adversary.
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4. OUR AGGREGATED 3-WAY HANDSHAKING PROTOCOL

4.1. PROTOCOL INTRODUCTION
Our basic 3-way handshaking protocol presented above is robust against a number
of attacks compromising authentication in collaborating sensor networks. However, the
major limitation of Protocol 1 is that each sensor individually forwards its response to the
operator. This will introduce significant communication overhead in large scale networks,
which our proposed 3-way Aggregated Protocol described below alleviates without
compromising security performance. We also assume that the total number of active
sensors in Network Si is m.

4.2. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Protocol 2 presents our aggregated 3-way handshaking protocol. This protocol
considers a sensor network clustered into a certain number of clusters. Each sensor
belongs to one cluster with a cluster-head. The operator is assumed to know which sensor
belongs to which cluster, which could be known just after deployment as sensors generate
clusters among themselves using techniques in [21, 22]. Protocol 2 is executed each time
(or round) when the Operator Oi intends to authenticate sensors belonging to network Si.
Consider an arbitrary Round r. The operator will broadcast a query vector containing the
nonce and encrypted challenge vectors for each sensor. This completes the first part of
the handshaking protocol.
After computing the PUF response P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i), each sensor will forward
its response to its cluster-head. Consider Cluster j for illustration. The cluster-head will
aggregate all responses in its cluster using the XOR function to compute G(r,j)i for Cluster
j. It will then broadcast G(r,j)i and responding sensor IDs to its upstream cluster-head and
all sensors in its cluster. The upstream cluster-head will once again perform aggregation
and this process continues towards the operator. Each sensor in Cluster j will store G(r,j)i
for subsequent verification in the event of a packet corruption. This completes the second
part of the handshaking protocol.
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Protocol 2 Aggregated 3-way Handshaking Protocol in Round r
1: A Sensor Network Clustered into J Clusters
2: Operator

 N( r ,1)i || Y1i ⊕ C( r ,1)i || Z1i ⊕ A( r ,1)i 


Oi  N( r ,1)i || Y1i ⊕ C( r ,1)i || Z1i ⊕ A( r ,1)i 





i
i
i
i
i
 N( r , m ) || Ym ⊕ C( r , m ) || Z m ⊕ A( r , m ) 

*

3: End 1-way handshake
4: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps
5: IF N(r,1)i is as expected
6:
IF Sensor ski is a NOT a Cluster-Head
7:
Extract C(r,k)i and A(r,k)i
8:
Compute P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i)
9:
ski [ski || P(r,k)i] Cluster-Head
10:
ELSE IF Sensor ski is a Cluster-Head of Cluster j
11:
Extract C(r,k)i and A(r,k)i
12:
Compute P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i)
13:
Compute G(r,j)i = P(r,k)i ⊕ P(r,j)i ∀ responding sensors sji in Cluster j
14:
Forward G(r,j)i, Sensor IDs to Peer Sensors and Upstream ClusterHead
15:
END IF
16: ELSE Reject Request
17: END IF
18: End 2-way handshake
19: Operator Oi executes the following steps for each Sensor ski
20: Compute ∀ responding sensors ski, ⊕ P(r,k)i
21: IF Response matches Expected Response
22:
Authenticated All Sensor IDs received as Active
23:
Compute Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i)
24: ELSE % malicious behavior detected
25:
Operator computes ∀ responding sensors ski in Cluster j, G(r,j)i = ⊕ P(r,k)i
26:

27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:

Operator

G( r ,1) i 


Oi G( r , 2)i 


...


i
G
 ( r ,m) 

*

FOR Each Cluster j in the Network
FOR Each sensor ski in Cluster j
Report P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i) to Operator
END FOR
END FOR
Operator can identify malicious sensors and consider them inactive
Operator sets Q(r,k)i = Random bit string ∀ inactive sensors ski

Continued on next page.
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Protocol 2 Continued
33:
Operator sets Q(r,k)i = Random bit string ∀ inactive sensors ski
34: END IF
35: Operator

Q( r ,1) i ⊕ Y1i || Q( r ,1) i ⊕ N ( r +1,1) i ⊕ Z1i 

i
i
Oi Q i ⊕ Y i || Q i ⊕ N

( r ,2)
2
( r , 2)
( r +1, 2 ) ⊕ Z 2


...


i
i
i
i
i
Q( r , m ) ⊕ Y1 || Q( r , m ) ⊕ N ( r +1, m ) ⊕ Z m 

36: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps
37: IF Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i)
38:
Extract Nonce N(r+1, 1)i for Round r + 1
39: ELSE Send P(r,k)i to Operator via multiple routing paths
40: END IF
41: End 3-way handshake
Upon receiving the aggregated response and all responding sensor ids, the
operator will compute ⊕ P(r,k)i for responding sensors ski. If this value matches the
aggregated response received from the immediate downstream cluster-head(s), the
authentication process is completed and all responding sensors are considered active.
Otherwise, at least one or more sensors generated a malicious response or an
intermediary malicious sensor processed a packet and corrupted it. In either case, the
operator will broadcast the expected aggregated responses to each cluster. When a sensor
receives G(r,j)i from the operator for its cluster, it will compare the correctness of its own
aggregated response that was forwarded to it by its own cluster-head. If the compared
values match, then there was no malicious sensor in its cluster and the sensor ignores the
message. If on the other hand, the compared values do not match, then the sensors in the
cluster will send their individual responses to the operator and the operator can now
detect the malicious response, since the sensor that was the source of the malicious
behavior will not be able to generate the correct PUF response. Similarly, corruptions of
packets by intermediate sensors can also be detected. After this step, all active sensors
will be correctly authenticated and the operator will send an authentication response
along with an encrypted form of the nonce to be used for the next round of
authentication. This completes the 3-way handshaking protocol.
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4.3. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Because of the similarities to Protocol 1, Protocol 2 and Protocol 1 share many of
the same security properties. Their defense against eavesdropping, reflection, DOS, and
physical attacks are the same in every respect except the time frame in which the attack
can occur. This occurs because the aggregation process requires an additional amount of
time that is missing from Protocol 1. Assuming that the networks are the same, Protocol 2
will usually take longer than Protocol 1.
4.3.1. Replay, Selective Forwarding, Packet Drop and Corruption Attacks.
These attacks gain a slight advantage in Protocol 2 due to the increase in the number of
message transmissions. Each of these attacks requires manipulating a target packet via
duplication, denial, or corruption, and so any increase in the number of packets being sent
in a protocol automatically increases the number of viable targets that these attacks can
be initiated on. In Protocol 2, 2 new message exchanges are introduced: the request for
specific PUF responses when a malicious node is detected and the subsequent reply. Both
of these messages can be targeted by the adversary. Unfortunately, that is the only
advantage that the adversary gains. The results of these attacks will be the same as in
Protocol 1 due to the packets being resent along different routes in the case of selective
forwarding and packet drop attacks and the requirement of a particular PUF response
during this exchange in the case of packet corruption and replay attacks.
4.3.2. Masquerade Attacks. The advantage gained by a masquerade attack is the
same as for the replay, selective forwarding, packet drop and corruption attacks as
described above: because of the increase in message exchanges, more opportunities are
available for the masquerading node to initiate an attack. But again, the attack is still
thwarted by the requirement of specific PUF responses that a masquerading node cannot
reproduce.
As shown, even with providing additional opportunities for an adversary to attack,
Protocol 2 is still resilient to a variety of attacks. There is the vulnerability to having
communications disrupted and blocked completely as mentioned in Protocol 1, but this
still does not inherently break the authentication protocol.
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4.4. DISCUSIONS OF IMPROVING SCALABILITY AND MALICIOUS SENSOR
IDENTICATION
Currently, when a single, aggregated response is returned to the operator
containing a malicious response, the entire cluster tree is queried to identify the exact
sensors that have been compromised. This introduces considerable overhead into the
network and also provides more opportunities for the adversary to compromise the
authentication process by targeting the messages being transmitted. By modifying how
the PUF responses are XOR’ed together, malicious sensors can be detected before steps
25 – 32 and / or reduce the number of potentially compromised nodes that must be
checked. Instead of ⊕ all P(r,k)i, each cluster head ⊕ its P(r,k)i with each received response
and then forwards this group response to the upstream cluster head. This results in each
leaf sensor being ⊕ with all its cluster heads in its tree branch. Additionally, each cluster
head can be uniquely identified by its sensor groupings. This allows for the operator to
identify where in the sensor network a malicious response was inserted, reducing the
number of sensors that must be queried if a cluster head is compromised and providing
immediate detection of compromised leaf sensors. The scalability of the network is also
improved as this greatly reduces the communication overhead that would be incurred
from querying entire cluster branches and improves detection as more leaf sensors and
cluster heads are added. The only downside to this fix is that the base communication
overhead in the aggregated PUF responses is increased by the number of leaf sensors.
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5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we addressed the problem of authentication in collaborating sensor
networks. Our protocols are based on Physically Unclonable Functions, an innovative
circuit primitive that provides a mechanism to extract secrets leveraging from physical
randomness in hardware fabrication of integrated circuits (ICs). Our protocols are lightweight, efficient, correct and highly resilient to a variety of attacks. Addressing other
security, privacy problems in collaborating sensor networks is part of future work.
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